Navy Technical Infrastructure at a Crossroads, Bold & Decisive Action is Required

James E. Colvard, Robert A. Kavetsky, Michael L. Marshall (2013)

The combined force of “change points” over the past 30 years has set the Navy on a treacherous road that could lead it to lose much of the remaining technical infrastructure it so desperately needs to create future naval capabilities. A disjointed, piecemeal approach has proven ineffective in the past and bodes ill for the future.

Systemic, top-down change is require to produce a viable, permanent solution to the problems afflicting the Navy’s technical infrastructure and processes. The Navy must reestablish the technically strong and balanced military / civilian teams and institutions of the past. The navy’s warfare centers must be utilized as “connecting institutions,” which can serve as the intellectual impedance match for young college graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and as a means of connecting the shore establishment with the fleet.

Contents

Chapter 1: Early History of the Navy Material Establishment

1.1…… Navy Bureaus and the Formation of the Bilinear Navy.

1.2…… Renewed Efforts to Change the Bureau System..

1.3…… Post-World War II Organizational Modifications to the Naval Establishment

1.4…… Evolution of Navy In-House Laboratories.

1.5…… Creation of the Office of Naval Research.

1.6…… “Chief of Naval Research,” Origin of the Term..

1.7…… Statutory and Other Authorities for ONR/CNR and Related Offices.

Chapter 2: Changes to the Navy’s Technical Infrastructure Following World War II.

2.1…… Cold War Race for Military Technological Superiority.

2.2…… The Military-Industrial Complex: Reaction to Excessive Outsourcing.

2.3…… Further Efforts to Reform the Bureaus and Their Laboratories.

2.4…… Dual-Executive Management of Navy Laboratories.

Chapter 3: Navy Labs: The Naval Material Command Years.

3.1…… Demise of the Bureaus.

3.2…… Laboratory Missions and Functions.

3.3…… The Navy RDT&E Centers Lose Their High Level Advocate.

3.4…… No Clearly Articulated Navy RDT&E Strategy.

Chapter 4: The Navy Responds to Goldwater-Nichols and the DMR..

4.1…… Diminished CNO Role in Warfighting, Acquisition.

4.2…… Unintended Consequences of Goldwater-Nichols.

4.3…… The Beach Task Force.

4.4…… DMRDs and Service Laboratory Consolidation Studies.

Chapter 5: Impact of BRAC on the Navy’s Technical Infrastructure.

5.1…… Abortive Attempt at Corporate Management of Navy Warfare Centers

5.2…… Adolph Commission Efforts.

5.3…… Workforce Downsizing Efforts.

Chapter 6: Growing Near-Term Focus of CNR and ONR..

6.1…… Consolidation of Navy S&T Under OCNR..

6.2…… Growing Emphasis on Technology Transition; Fragmentation of S&T Effort

6.3…… CNR as Director, Navy T&E and Technology Requirements (OP-091)

6.4…… CNR as DON T&E Executive.

6.5…… Is the CNR Title Now a Misnomer?.

Chapter 7: Emphasizing Acquisition Over Internal Technical Competence.

7.1…… Acquisition Reform: Lots of Change But Questionable Improvement

7.2…… The “Redefined” Defense Acquisition Workforce.

7.3…… Erosion of Internal Navy Technical Competence.

Chapter 8: The Way Ahead.

8.1…… Wrong Course, Wrong Speed.